Security

Security is a primary concern for us in the curl project. We take it seriously and we work hard on providing secure and safe implementations of all protocols and related code. As soon as we get knowledge about a security related problem or just a suspected problem, we deal with it and we attempt to provide a fix and security notice no later than in the next pending release.

We use a responsible disclosure policy, meaning that we prefer to discuss and work on security fixes out of the public eye and we alert the vendors on the openwall.org list a few days before we announce the problem and fix to the world. This, in an attempt to shorten the time span the bad guys can take advantage of a problem until a fixed version has been deployed.

Past security problems

During the years we have had our fair share of security related problems. We work hard on documenting every problem thoroughly with all details listed and clearly stated to aid users. Users of curl should be able to figure out what problems their particular curl versions and use cases are vulnerable to.

To help with this, we present this waterfall chart showing how all vulnerabilities affect which curl versions and we have this complete list of all known security problems since the birth of this project.

Backdoors and supply chain risks

With libcurl being installed and running in billions of installations all over the world and in countless different environments, we recognize that it is an ideal target for someone who wants a backdoor somewhere.

A new or old maintainer might at any point propose a change that sounds innocent and well-meaning but has a disguised malicious intent.

To mitigate such risks, we apply established procedures and techniques:

• GitHub. The curl project uses https://github.com/curl/curl as its main source code git repository since 2010. We rely on their hosting to secure access as per our configuration.
• 2FA required. We require all maintainers with push access to git to have two-factor authentication enabled, to reduce the risk that attackers can impersonate them and use their credentials to push source code changes. We rely on GitHub's 2FA setup.
• Reviews. Every contribution that are proposed for inclusion in the project is reviewed by a maintainer. All changes are always done publicly in the open to allow all interested parties to participate. No invitation needed. All changes are also automatically checked, tested and scanned by numerous tools before accepted.
• Readable code. We believe in readable code that follows our code style. Easy to read makes it easy to debug. If code is hard to read it should be improved until it gets easy to read. With easy to read code, smuggling malicious payloads or hiding nefarious functionality is excruciatingly hard.
• Tests. We have a large test suite that is always growing and we do not accept changes that break existing tests and new functionality need to bring new tests for the new functionality. We run several hundred thousands tests on each proposed changed to make sure existing functionality remains. This includes fuzzers, static code analyzers, fault injectors and more.
• No binary blobs. All files stored in version control, in the git repository is readable or is otherwise small and documented. There is no place anywhere for any hidden encrypted payload. We run a scanner on all files on every change to detect binary files and the few files that need to remain looking binary are manually vetted and verified against a checksum.
• Reproducible builds. curl releases are shipped as tarballs that are hosted on the curl website (https://curl.se). We provide documentation, docker setups and configurations etc to allow anyone wanting to easily reproduce our release builds to generate identical images - proving that what we ship is only contents taken from the git repository plus other correct and properly generated contents.
• Signed commits. Over 90% - not all - of recent commits were signed to help prove provenance. Signing commits is not yet a mandatory requirement for committers but we hope to gradually increase the share over time and make it mandatory soon.
• Signed releases. Every release, every uploaded tarball, is signed by Daniel. This helps to prove that the files have not been tampered with since they were produced. We have opted to not sign them by multiple persons only because of the added complexity for the relatively small extra protection.
• Signed tags. Every release is generated from the exact state of the git tree where a corresponding signed tag is set. The name of the release tag is the same as the release version.
• Fix all vulnerabilities quickly. Whenever we receive a security vulnerability report, we create and ship a fix in the next pending release. Sometimes sooner than previously planned. Only in extremely rare cases does it take longer than a release cycle, but in the name of accuracy and correctness we do reserve the right to spend time on research to get it right. With every fixed security vulnerability we release a detailed description of the flaw including exact commit that introduced the problem, recommendations for users and more. Further, the security advisories get announced to the world.